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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Nature of the Case
This case involves a dispute over a road and right-of-way in Freinont County, which road
crosses both the plaintiffslappellants' (hereafter "the Birds") and the defendantslrespondents'
(hereafter "the Bidwells") respective properties. The Birds assert that they have an implied easement
from prior use over the road which crosses the Bidwells' property.
11. Course of Proceedinvs

The Birds filed a Verified Complaint For Declarative and Injunctive Relief on August 9,
2007, in Fremont County Case No. CV-2007-443, claiming an implied easement by prior use.
Bidwells filed an Answer on August 16,2007. Thereafter, discovery was conducted and trial was
held on January 3 1,2008. The trial court entered a Judgment, Memorandum Decision, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 4,2008 denying the Birds' requested relief. The Birds filed
a Notice of Appeal on May 12,2008.
111. Facts

Virgil Mickelson is the father of Appellant Verla Bird, respondent Linda Bidwell and Carol
Murri (who is not a party to these proceedings).The Birds were granted a parcel of property' in
Fremont County, Idaho on December 18,1995, by Warranty Deed from Virgil Miclcelson. (Tr. Vol.

I, p.9, L.4-19; Trial Exhibit 8). On the same day, the Bidwells were granted by Warranty Deed a

bi his parcel is referred to on the respective deeds as parcel "2"
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parcel of propertyZimmediately to the north of the Birds' parcel of property. (Tr. Vol I., p. I, L. 1920; Trial Exhibit 2). That same day, Virgil Mickelson also granted by Warranty Deed to Roger and
Carol Murri the parcel ofproperty? immediately to the south ofthe Birds' property. (Tr. VoI. I, Trial
Exhibit 9). The Bidwells purchased that parcel from the Munis in the year 2000 and currently own
it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.199, L. 16-23). The parties stipulated at the beginning of trial that all the parcels in
controversy were owned, in unity of ownership, by Virgil Mickelsen, at the time of the grant of the
dominant estate, which estate is owned by the Birds. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 2, L. 19-25; Tr. Vol I. p.3, L. 1-4).
The Deedgranting property to the Bidwells contained language that granted to them a "30
Ft. right of way into the property along the west side of property and through and around the existing
buildings." (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 2). The Deeds granting property to the Birds and Murris
respectively granted the property and contained the following language: "Excepting thereon that part
used for the 30 ft. right of way on west side of property & road and highway right ofway." (Tr. Vol.

I, Trial Exhibit 8,9)(emphasis added). The Birds were also granted an additional 66-foot wide strip
of land on the east side of the Mickelson properties, which strip abuts the county road. (Tr. Vol. I,
Trial Exhibit 8).
Regarding this "right ofway", (which is referred to in testimony and the record as "the road"

his parcel is referred to on the respective deeds as parcel "1".
3 ~ h i parcel
s
is referred to on the respective deeds as parcel "3".
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or "the lane"): the trial court made specific findings of fact, which include the following:
Prior to 1954, the lane served as access to a family home located across the canal on what
is now parcel #I
owned by the Bidwells. Since that time the lane has been fenced on both
sides and used as a farm lane to haul hay, move cattle between the corrals and pasture, access
the northern end ofthe farm, clean ditches, picnic, access a flume across the canal to facilitate
repairs, move farm machinery, etc.

(R. Vol I, p. 20).
It is the Birds' position that they openly and contiiluously used this Road for access to the
parcel of land that was deeded to them in 1995. Mike and Verla Bird testified that they had used the
lane, and witnessed others using the lane numerous times before 1995. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1 I, L. 8-25;
p.12, L.l-17; p.71, L.4-24). The Court made a finding of fact that "[plrior to 1995, either Virgil
Mickelson or Roger Murri operated the farm and used the lane, as necessary, for purposes related
to farming. Other family members sporadically used the lane when visiting the family farm." (R.
Vol. I, p.21). The Birds' son, Jeff Bird, testified that he had personally used the Road many times
prior to 1995, especially during the time that he lived with his grandparents, the Micltelsons, on the
properties that were later deeded to the Birds and Bidwells. (Tr. Vol. I, p.86, L.2-25; p.87, L.l-25;
p.88, L.l-25).
Jeff Bird also testified that there was no other road for access to the parcel which became the
Birds' property. (Tr. Vol I, p.89, L.2-9). Jeff testified that he once became stuck in the ground next
to the 66-ft. strip of land that was deeded to his parents, because irrigation season had made the

Throughout this brief, the "right of way" at issue will be referred to as "the Road" or "the Lane".
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ground wet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.100, L.9-25). Mike Bird also testified that they could not use the 66-footwide strip of land as an access to their property. (Tr. Vol I, p.22, L.2-16). The Birds had obtained
a bid for the cost of building a road on that 66-foot-wide strip of land, but the bid was financially
prohibitive at an estimated cost of approximately $30,000.00. (Tr. Vol I, p.121, L.8-11).
Although the parties received ownership of their respective parcels in December of 1995,
there was no dispute over use of the Road until after Virgil Mickelson passed away in 2006. (R. Vol.

I, p. 7-8). In the summer of 2007, the Bidwells informed Birds they would be "cut off' from use of
the Road. (R. Vol. I, p. 7-8). The Birds filed a Verified Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive
Relief on August 9,2007 seeking a declaration that they had an implied easement by prior use for
the Road. (R. Vol. I, p. 5-10).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the trial court err in finding that the language of the deeds to parcels #1, #2 and

#3 specifically excepted the lane froin the Birds' use?
B.

Did the trial court err in finding that it must be inferred from the Mickelsons'

exception ofthe lane from the deed transcriptions of deeds #2 and #3 that the Mickelsons intended
to provide access only to parcel #1 across their homestead and along the existing lane?
C.

Did the trial court err in finding that "there [was] no other explanation for [the

Mickelsons'] decision to convey the extra 66 feet to the Birds, while exempting the lane, if it was
intended that the Birds continue to use the lane to access that parcel"?
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D.

Did the trial court err in considering and applying the language of the deeds to its

determination of whether the Birds had an implied easement from prior use?
E.

Did the trial court e n in making findings of fact regarding Virgil Mickelson's

subjective intent with regard to the use of the lane?

F.

Did the trial court err in finding that "the cost of placing a lane along the 66 foot strip

from the road to parcel #2 [was] a matter of coiisiderable dispute"?

G.

Did the trial court err in examining and considering facts other than the use of the

easement to determine whether there was apparent continuous use long enough before separation of
the'dominant Estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent?

H.

Did the trial court err in finding that "when the Mickelsons, at the Birds' request,

deeded the strip abutting the county road and specifically excluded the lane in the same deed they
extinguished any basis for the Birds to rely on what may otherwise have been an implied easement
to use the lane"?

I.

Did the trial court err in finding that "the specific reference to a right of way in the

Deed conveying parcel #1 to the Bidwells, coupled with the speciiic exceptions to the lane found in
the language of the Deeds conveying parcel #2 and parcel #3,clearly establish that the Mickelsons
did not convey nor did they intend to grant an easement across their homestead or on the lane along
the western portion of parcel #3 for the benefit of the Murris or the Birds."?
J.

9-
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to establish that use of the lane was ever intended to continue for any parcel other than parcel #I
when the Mickelsons divided their farm among the family"?

ATTORNEY FEES
The Birds request their attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code $3 12-121,
12-123, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, or
other applicable rule of civil procedure, or statute.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a case has been tried to a court, it is the province of the trial judge to weigh the
conflicting evidence and testimony and to assess the credibility of witnesses. I.R.C.P. 52(a);

Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432,434-35,90 1 P.2d 1333,
1335-36(1995). On appellate review, the trial court's findings that are supported by substantial and
competent evidence will not be set aside, Id .; Margaret H.Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,
256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993), and those findings will be liberally construed in favor of the
judgment entered. Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 547, 808 P.2d 1289, 1292
(1991). However, the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's legal conclusions, and is free
to draw its own legal conclusions from the facts presented. Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc., 127 Idaho
at435,901 P.2dat 1336; KawaiFarms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,613,826 P.2d 1322,1325
(1992).
Further, the appellate court should freely review the question of whether the facts found, or

10-

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

stipulated to, are sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied easement.
Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,640, 991 P.2d 362,365 (1999), citing Walker v. Hollinger, 132
Idaho 172, 176, 968 P.2d 661, 665 (1998). The trial court's findings of fact will be upheld if
supported by substantial and competent evidence, but the appellate court will freely review the trial
court's conclusions of law. Leavitt v. Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664,668, 132 P.3d 421,425 (2006).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE
DEEDS TO PARCELS #l. 512 AND 513 SPECIFICALLY EXCEPTED THE LANE
FROM THE BIRDS' USE

The trial court made a finding that the Mickelsons, in granting a deed to the Birds, and a deed
to the Murris, "specifically excepted the lane in the deed conveying [the parcels]." (R. Vol. I, p. 24).
The trial court then found that:
"The Bidwell deed specifically grants a 'right of way' through the homestead and along the
lane to access parcel #I. On the other hand, the Bird deed to parcel #2, and the Murri deed
to parcel #3 specifically except the lane from such use, and both parcels abut the county road
under the conveyance. Were it not for these facts, the Court would conclude that the doctrine
of implied easement bv prior use would support the Birds' claim to use the lane."
(R. Vol. I, p. 24 (emphasis added)).
There is no evidence in the record for the proposition that the Mickelsons or the respective
Deeds excepted the lane from the use of the Birds or the Murris. A plain reading of the Deed shows
that the lane is excepted from ownership by the Birds or Murris. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 8).
Indeed, the paragraph in which the "excepting" language is found describes the bounds of the
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property which granted ownership to the Birds and Murris. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 8). Further,
the "excepting" language of the deed states that what is excepted is "that Dart used for the 30 ft.
right of way ..." not the use of the right of way. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 8)(emphasis added). There
is no language in any deed even referencing the x e of the road, let alone any explicit language
denying that use to the Birds or the Murris. It is an unreasonable supposition by the trial court that
this "excepting" language was meant to explicitly deny the Birds the

of the lane, rather than its

ownership, even when read in connection with a grant ofproperty to the Birds which abuts a county
road. A granting to the Bidwells in their Deed of a "right of way" on the road is not inconsistent
with subsequent use by others of the same road and "right of way".
In contravention of the trial court's unreasonable supposition is the language of the deed by
which Mickelsons transferred the majority of the property at issue to Roger Murri in 1986. As Mike
Bird testified at trial, Roger Murri was purchasing the property from Virgil Mickelson from 1986
untiI May of 1995, when, due to a failure to make payments, the land was deeded back to Virgil
Mickelson. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 39, L.12-25; p. 40, L.l-18). The Deed which transferred the property to
Roger Murri at that time also referenced a "right-of-way", and "excepted" froin the deed, along with
several specific items of property, "the county road right-of-way along the South boundary of the
property." (Trial Exhibit 17). The road is referred to as "right-of-way", yet interpreting this use to
mean "right to use" would be nonsensical, as Micltelsons did not have the power to deny use of the
county road to anyone. It is clear that the term "right-of-way" was used as a synonym for "road",
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and was to designate the dimensions of the property excepted, not as a proscription on use. Indeed,
Mike Bird testified that he had never been denied use of the lane, even during the time Roger Murri
"owl~ed"the property. (Tr. Vol I, p.25, L.13-18). VerlaBird testified that she had never beendenied
use of the lane, even during the time Roger Murri "owned" the property. (Tr. Vol I, p.71, L.ll-25;
p.72, L.l).
The testimony of the Mike Bird at the time of his deposition also contravenes the trial court's
unreasonable supposition. Although the Birds contended then, and contend now that such
information is not relevant to the determination of the issues herein, Mike Bird testified that since
the granting of the deeds in 1995, until Virgil's death in 2007, Virgil Miclcelson had never reminded
the Birds of any obligatioil to build another road, nor asked the Birds to build a road on their 66-foot
wide strip. (Trial Exhibit 43, p.56, L.l-10). After the severance of the parcels in 1995, the Birds
were never denied use of the road by Virgil Mickelson or anyone else until after Virgil's death in
2006. (R. Vol I, p.7-8).
For the trial court's reasoning to be consistent, the court would have to find that Virgil
Mickelson intended to deny himself the use ofthe lane after the grant in 1995, while still maintaining
a homestead that the "right-of way" traversed. Yet, there is no testimony that Virgil Mickelson ever
built another access road from his homestead to the county road. The trial court's reasoning defies
common sense and the plain language of the deeds. If Virgil Mickelson "intended" to deny the use
of the lane to the Birds, and consequently granted them the 66-foot strip explicitly as an alternate
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access, why is the 66-foot strip not explicitly referred to as a "road and right-of-way"? It is not
logically consistent to infer specific intent from the grantor based on portions of the deed, and ignore
other portions of the same deed which contradict or conflict with such inferred intent.
It is also an unreasonable conclusion by the trial court that reserving ownership is always
the same as explicitly denying use of the land by others. If this conclusioil were to stand, the entire
law of easements in Idaho would be abolished. An easement, by definition, is " the right to use
land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by
the owner." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 273, 127 P.3d 167, 176 (2005) (emphasis added)
(quoting Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dtrt. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991))
(internal quotations omitted). If an easement (the right to use the land) must be expressly granted
in a deed before it becomes enforceable, the entire body of law regarding implied easements would
also be abolished. The reservation of land in a granting deed cannot, without more, operate to defeat
an easement. Further, the conclusion that the use ofthe term "right of way" was intended to convey
intention regarding future use is an unsupportable and illogical conclusion. As noted above, there
is no competent evidence or support, either in logic, common use of language, nor the actual
language of the deeds, for the conclusion that the deeds even addressed the Birds' use of the disputed
lane, let alone explicitly denied thein that use.
The trial court erred in holding that the language of reservation in the Birds' deed defeated
their claim of implied easement by prior use. And, because the trial court expressly held that, if not

14-
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for this finding, it would have held that the Birds' satisfied the elements of their claim for an implied
easement by prior use, the Birds are entitled to judgment that they have an easement over the
disputed Road.
11.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EXTRA 66 FEET
GRANTED TO THE BIRDS

In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the party asserting the easement must
prove three elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate
to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably
necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Thomas v. hiadsen, I42 Idaho 635,638
(2006); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637 (1999).
In this case, the parties stipulated that the first element was satisfied. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 2, L. 1925; p.3, L.l-4).

However, the trial court's finding that "[tlhere is no other explanation for their

decision to convey the extra sixty-six feet to the Birds, while exempting the lane, if it was intended
that the Birds continue to use the lane to access that parcel" was in error and confuses the remaining
two elements. The trial court was to consider the use of the lane and determine whether the use was
lo11g enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be
permanent. The subiective intent of the ranto or is not relevant to this determination, and specifically
irrelevant to the question of whether the use of the road was "apparent and continuous". See Thomas,
142 Idaho at 638.
15-
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In determining whether an implied easement by prior use has been established, Idaho law
does not contemplate an inquiry into the mind of the grantor or his subjective intentions. For
example, in the case of Thomas v Madsen, the plaintiff was the grantor himself. Id at 637. There
is no mention anywhere in the Supreme Court's analysis of any inquiry into the intentions of the
grantor (Thomas) at the time of severance, which would surely have disposed of the matter
conclusively in favor of the plaintiff. However, the only inquiry was into the use of the road. So it
must be in this case as well. The Birds have provided volu~ninoustestimony regarding not only their
"apparent and continuous" use of the road, (which testimony is wholly uncontradicted by the
Bidwells), but also of the use of the road by the grantor Virgil Mickelsen (wl~ichtestimony was
likewise uncontradicted by the Bidwells). (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, L. 8-25; p. 12, L. 1-17; p.71, L.4-24; p.86,
L.2-25; p.87, L.l-25; p.88, L.l-25; R. Val. I, p.21).
Even if the grantor's subjective intent were relevant, there is no competent evidence to
support the conclusion that grantor Virgil Mickelson intended to deny the use of the lane to the
Birds. First, there is nothing logically inconsistent with granting the Birds land which abuts a county
road on the east side of the property while simultaneously allowing them to use the Road on the west
side of the property. That is, there is no law which forbids a party more than one access point, and
the conjecture by the trial court that grantor Virgil Mickelson could not have intended the Birds to
have multiple access points is wholly unwarranted and unsupported by any testimony or competent
evidence in the record. In fact, as conjectures go, it is much more likely that Virgil Mickelson drafted
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the deeds to assure that the Birds could not cut off the Bidwells' access, rather than to assure that the
Birds' access was denied.
The trial court's conjecture is directly contradicted by Mike Bird's testimony. He testified
that after severance of the parcels in 1995, until Virgil's death in 2007, grantor Virgil Mickelson had
never reminded the Birds of any obligation to build another road, nor asked the Birds to build a road
on their 66-foot wide strip. (Trial Exhibit 43, p.56, L. 1-10). Jeff Bird, the Birds' son, testified that
his grandfather, Virgil Mickelson had never told him that he couldn't travel the Road on the threewheeler or a pickup truck. (Tr. Vol., I, p.113, L.ll-17). Further, the Birds had continuously used
the Road to access their parcel after the severance for nearly 12 years, until the summer of 2007,
when the Bidwells first denied the Birds use of the Road, thus precipitating this litigation. (R. Vol
I, p.7-8).
I f , as the trial court decided, "there is no other explanation for their decision to convey the
extra sixty-six feet to the Birds, while exempting the lane, if it was intended that the Birds continue
to use the lane to access that parcel", then why did Virgil Mickelson, in the eleven years between
severance of the parcels and his death, never forbid the Birds from using the Road, nor require that
they build a usable road on the 66-foot-wide strip of land? If it was Virgil Mickelson's intent that
the Road be used only by the Bidwells after the severance, why did the Bidwells not attempt to cut
off the Birds' use of the Road until after Virgil Mickelson had passed away? (R. Vol I, p.7). The
only reasonable answer is that Virgil Mickelson never had such "intent".
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Finally, the trial court's finding that "there is no other explanation for their decision to
convey the extra sixty-six feet to the Birds, while exempting the lane, if it was intended that the Birds
continue to use the lane to access that parcel" improperlytakes into account the 66-foot strip of land,
deeded to the Birds, which abuts a county road. The trial court is essentially ruling that because part
of the Birds' property borders the public highway and therefore was not landlocked, the Birds could
have simply built another access road, and that thispossibility weighs against their implied easement
by prior use.. However, because an implied easement from prior use requires only reasonable

necessity, not great present necessity, there is no requirement that the dominant estate be landlocked.

Thomas, 142 Idaho at 639. In Thomas, the Court specifically rejected an argument by the defendant
that the plaintiff could simply have built another road on his own land. Id The trial court has
improperly considered this fact in its analysis of the Birds' implied easement in this case.
There is no competent evidence to support the trial court's findings on the subjective intent
of the grantor, Virgil Mickelson, regarding the use of the Road at issue. Further, the trial court erred
by improperly considering the subjective intent of the grantor when applying Idaho law on implied
easements by prior use.
111.

TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT "THE COST OF PLACING A
LANE ALONG TI-IE 66 FOOT STRIP FROM THE ROAD TO PARCEL #2 [WAS]
A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE DISPUTE

The third element of a claim for implied easement by prior use is that the easement must be
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638 .
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However, as Idaho cases have made clear, reasonable necessity is something less than the "great
present necessity" required for an easement implied by necessity. Davis,133 Idaho at 643. It is the
task of the trial court to balance the respective convenience, inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent
facts when determining whether the easement is reasonably necessary. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638.
However, the trial court's factual findings must be based upon substantial and competent evidence.
In Thomas, the trial court analyzed the reasonable necessity of the road at issue by weighing
the expense and time of constructing a road of the same quality on Thomas's land. Id

In this

matter, the trial court found that the cost of placing a lane along the Birds' 66-foot strip of land
"[wals a matter of considerable dispute". (R. Vol. I, p. 25). However, there is no substantial and
competent evidence in support ofthis proposition. The Birds' engaged an expert, Jack Zollinger, to
testify regarding the expected cost of building a road on that strip of land. Mr. Zollinger testified that
he had been in the construction business since 1976 (Tr. Vol., I, p.114, L. 19-20), that he had a
degree in civil engineering (Tr. Vol., 1, p. 114, L.23-25), and that he has built roads for the Forest
Service, the Idaho Department of Transportation, Fremont County, and the cities of Rexburg, St.
Anthony and Sugar City. (Tr. Vol., I, p. 116, L.3-6). He testified that he had built every kind ofroad
during his career. (Tr. Vol., I, p. 116, L.7-10). He testified that he had visited the Birds' property,
surveyed the ground and compiled a bid for a road on that ground. (Tr. Vol., I, p. 117, L.16-25,
p. 118, L. 1- 17; Trial Exhibit 10). The bid was a lump sum for mobilization and cubic yard prices for
gravel. (Tr. Vol., I, p.118, 1.21-25; p.119, L.l-4). The bid for the road was approximately
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$30,000.00. (Tr. Vol., I, p.121, L.8-11). Mr. Zollinger testified that he could build a road of lesser
quality for three or four thousand dollars less than that $30,000 bid, but such would expose the road
to the risks of not standing up to the elements. (Tr. Vol., I, p.122, L.15-24). He testified that his
rates were comparable to the rates of other road buiIders in the area. (Tr. Vol., I, p.123, L.21-24).
The Bidwells produced no witness or expert to testify regarding the cost of building a road
on the 66-foot strip of land. Instead, they simply submitted a "bid" they'd received from Parker Sand
and Gravel, a gravel company in Rexburg, Idaho. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 39). The "bid" was for
$6,800.00, submitted to Gary Bidwell. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 39). There was no testimony from
Bidwells or any of their witnesses regarding what methods were used by Parker Sand and Gravel
to compile such "bid."
However, Mr. Zollinger testified that such "bid" contemplated only the "bare minimum",
including simply depositing a minimal amount of gravel on the "road", without any preparation. (Tr.
Vol. I,p.125, L.4-13). Further, Mr. Zollinger testified that the risks associated with this type o f 'bid"
would be that the "road" would eventually develop "muck holes" and the material would have been
wasted. (Tr. Vol. I, p.125, L.17-25; p. 126, L.l-6).
Mr. Zollinger's testimony was uncontroverted. There simply is no competent evidence in the
record for the trial court's determination that there was "considerable dispute" about the cost of
building a road on the 66-foot strip of land. To the degree that the trial court factored this "dispute"
into its conclusions that the Birds had not satisfied the third element of the their claim, that of
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"reasonable necessity", the trial court erred
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT "WHEN THE MICKELSONS,
AT THE BIRDS' REOUEST, DEEDED THE STRIP ABUTTING THE COUNTY
ROAD AND SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED THE LANE I
N THE SAME DEED
THEY EXTINGUISHED ANY BASIS FOR THE BIRDS TO RELY ON WHAT
MAY OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AN IMPLIED EASEMENT TO USE THE
LANE

The trial court essentially concluded that the Birds knew at the time of severance that they
had no right to use the Lane because of the language in the Deed and because they were granted land
on the east side of the property which abuts a county road. The trial court then concluded that this
lcnowledge "extinguished" their implied easement by prior use. I-Iowever, these conclusions are
totally at odds with the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Davis and Thomas.
As noted above, the language of the deed to the Birds excepts from their ownership "that
part" of the land contained within the land description which is "used for the 30 ft. road and right
of way". (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 8). This language could not possible have put the Birds "on
notice" that they were denied the useofthe Lane, notwithstandingthe specific exemption of the Lane
from their ownership
More importantly, in Davis, at the time the Davises purchased the property from their
predecessors-in-interest,they knewthat their estate was not landlocked. Davis, 133 Idaho at 640-41.
Further, the Davises had actuallv built another access road on their property since the time of
severance, and before the initiation of the lawsuit. Id. at 643. However, the Court held that "the
well-established rule is that, unlike an easement by way of necessity, an implied easement by prior
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use is not later extinguished if the easement is no longer reasonably necessary." Id The Davises'
knowledge did not extinguish their basis for an implied easement by prior use.
If an easement by prior use cannot be extinguished by later

access along another

portion of ground, the Birds fail to see how it could be extinguished by the theoretical future access
along another portion of ground. In fact, this "theoretical future" access is discussed by the Court
in the Thomas decision.
Mr. Thomas's property was not landlocked either and Mr. Thomas, being the grantor, knew
at the time of severance that it was not landlocked. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638. The defendant argued
that Mr. Thoinas "could have simply built another access road." Id. The Court flatly rejected this
argument. "[Tlhere is no requirement that the dominant estate be landlocked." Id. (citing Davis, 133
Idaho at 637.)
The trial court erred by concluding that the Birds' right to an implied easement by
prior use was "extinguished" by either a request for land abutting the county road or the fact that
such land did abut the county road.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED W DETERMINING THAT THEBIRDS FAILED TO
MEET THEIR BURDEN TO ESTABLISH THAT USE OF THE LANE
WAS EVER INTENDED TO CONTINUE FOR ANY PARCEL OTHER THAN
PARCEL #1 WHEN THEMICKELSONSDIVIDED THEIRFARM AMONG THE
FAMILY.

All of the trial court's errors regarding the language of the respective Deeds and the Birds'
possession of property abutting the county road occurred because the trial courl strayed from the
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standards set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Davis and Thomas. In those cases, the Court
very clearly stated that:
In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the party asserting the easement must
prove three elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of
the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement
must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.

Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638.
As noted above, the first element was stipulated to by the parties. As to the second element,
the trial court made a factual finding that, since 1954,"the lane ha[d] been fenced on both sides and
used as a farm lane to haul hay, move cattle between the corrals and pasture, access the northern end
of the farm, clean ditches, picnic, access a flume across the canal to facilitate repairs, move farm
machinery, etc." (R. Vol I, p.20). The trial court also made a finding that "[plrior to 1995, either
Virgil Mickelson or Roger Murri operated the farm and used the lane, as necessary, for purposes
related to farming. Other family members sporadically used the lane whenvisiting the family farm."
(R. Vol. I, p.22). However, rather than apply these facts to the second element of the standard
("apparent continuous use long enough before separation ofthe dominant estate to show that the use
was intended to be permanent"), the trial court used a different standard to determine whether the
Birds had an implied easement from prior use. That standard appears to be either the "subjective
intent of the grantor" and/or "whether the use is expressly granted in the Deed". The Birds submit
that the use of these alternative standards is clear legal error.
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Even if the use of these alternative standards were not directly contradicted by binding
precedent, the logical basis for such standards is deeply flawed. A standard that makes an express
easement in the Deed aprerequisite for the finding of an implied easement is a logically impossible
standard, and would turn the law of easements on its ear.
The parties stipulated to the first element. On the second element, the Birds produced
substantial evidence and testimony, and the trial court made findings of fact that the Birds had
enjoyed open, continuous use of the Road at the time of severance. On the third element, the Birds
produced uncontroverted evidence and testimony that building a road on their land that abutted the
county road would cost more than $30,000.00. Yet the trial court applied a different standard to
defeat the Birds' claim.
Because this court exercises free review over questions of law, this court can find, based
on the actual evidence adduced at trial, that the Birds satisfied the three elements required by Idaho
law for establishing an implied easement by prior use. The trial court's own findings of fact
support this conclusion when the proper law is applied to those findings.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffslappellants request that this Court issue its decision
vacating the entry ofjudgment against plaintiffs and instead enter judgment for plaintiffs, and find
that the Birds have satisfied the elements of an implied easement by prior use.
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DATED this 14th day of August, 2008.
NALDER LAW OFFICE, P.C.

By:

-

Benjamin K. Mason, Esq.
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copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the
correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
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